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Commentary 
The pure effects described by Robins and Greenland,1 and later called natural effects by Pearl,2 
have been criticized because they require a cross-world independence assumption.3, 4 In this 
paper, we use potential outcomes and sufficient causal sets to present a conceptual perspective of 
the cross-world independence assumption that explains why the clinical utility of natural effects 
is sometimes greater than that of controlled effects. Our perspective is consistent with recent 
work on mediation of natural effects,5 path specific effects6, 7 and separable effects.8  
 
Controlled Direct Effects (CDE) and Natural Direct Effects (NDE) 
We use a simple example of smoking and lung disease (Figure 1). Smoking causes inhalation of 
dangerous chemicals, which causes an increase in chronic obstructive lung disease (COPD). 
Occupation (e.g. firefighters) causes inhalation of harmful chemicals leading to lung disease, and 
there may also be heat-related lung damage. Further, consider the context 20 years ago and the 
desire to find a way to eliminate harmful chemicals from cigarettes. Estimating the causal effects 
if such an intervention were possible would inform on the potential benefit of some form of e-
cigarettes even though they did not exist at the time. We focus on the direct effect, which 
provides the causal effect of the main exposure in the presence of such an intervention, Indirect 
effects provide the causal effect that would be blocked by the intervention and have similar 
utility. Although we consider smoking as a single intervention for simplicity, it occurs over long 
periods of time and all our variables can be conceptualized as time-dependent. 
 
 
Figure 1: The causal diagram in A represents the naturally occurring context 
for the effects of smoking (A) on chronic obstructive lung disease (COPD) 
acting partially through the mediator (M) of inhaled harmful chemicals. 
Occupation (C) may also cause inhaled chemicals, as well as heat-related 
damage. In B, the causal diagram represents the context where one is 
interested in CDE. In this world, the investigator fixes M to a specific value 
(e.g., M = 0), which means there can be no other causes of M, and all arrows 
into M are removed. In C, the causal diagram represents the context where 
one is interested in NDE. In this world, the investigator removes the 
mechanism by which A affects M (no arrow from A to M) but leaves all 
other mechanisms affecting M intact.  
 
The CDE in our example is the effect of smoking that is not mediated through an increase in 
harmful chemical inhalation. Mathematically, it is the effect that would be observed if everyone 
was switched from A = 0 to A = 1, while keeping M fixed at a particular value for everyone (e.g. 
M = 0, one-world). In this new world (Figure 1b), M is fixed and is no longer caused by any 
variable in the causal diagram. The investigators’ intervention to fix M (sophisticated mask, e-
cigarette) does not have to be included in the causal diagram because it is not a common cause of 
any two variables.9 Within a randomized experiment framework, the investigator fixes M to a 
value, and then randomizes participants to A = 0 or A = 1 to obtain the CDE for M = m. 
 
The NDE is also the effect that occurs through smoking that is not mediated through harmful 
chemical inhalation, but differs from the CDE because M is expected to be fixed at different 
values for different participants. Mathematically, it is the effect that would be observed if 
everyone was switched from A = 0 to A = 1, while keeping M at the value it would have if A = 
0. In this world, A no longer affects M, but other factors such as environmental exposure, 
continue to do so (Figure 1c). This is called the cross-world independence assumption because 
within a randomized experiment framework, we require fixing the value of M when A = 1 (one 
world) to what it would have been had A = 0 (a second world).3 This is not possible in a simple 
randomized experiment. Mathematically, where C is a mediator-outcome confounder: 
 𝑌(𝑎,𝑚) ⊥ 𝑀(𝑎))	|	 
 
This has led some to question the meaningfulness of NDE, and also to the development of 
“interventional natural effects” that can theoretically be assessed through randomized trials.10, 11, 
12 In this paper, we focus on the importance of the interpretation of the traditional NDE and 
CDE, rather than the difficulty in estimating them.  
 
A Potential Outcomes Framework 
From a potential outcomes framework, both CDE and NDE require measurements associated 
with three and only three single interventions. For CDE with M = 0 (Figure 1b): 
1. Fix M = 0 (harmful chemical inhalation = 0) for every person throughout the experiment. 
No measurements.  
2. Fix A = 0 (no smoking), measure Y. 
3. Fix A = 1(smoking), measure Y. 
4. The CDE is a contrast between the risk of COPD (Y) with smoking (intervention #3) and 
risk of COPD without smoking (intervention #2).  
 
There are four important points to clarify. First, “fixing a variable” means our intervention on M 
must perfectly determine the value of M, regardless of other known causes. Therefore, we must 
eliminate all arrows into M in Figure 1b. Second, some may add a new variable representing our 
intervention on M to create an “extended graph” 13. Third, because A does not cause M in this 
world (Figure 1b), we can choose to fix either A or M first, as long as we measure Y after both 
variables are fixed. If we fix M first, we can confirm that changing A does not affect M.  
 
For NDE, we also require only three interventions, but in a different order: 
1. Fix A = 0 (no smoking), measure M (harmful chemical inhalation) and measure Y (risk 
of COPD). 
2. Fix M = the value after our first intervention (no smoking) for each participant. No 
measurements. 
3. Fix A = 1 (smoking), measure Y (COPD). 
4. The NDE is a contrast between the risk of COPD with smoking (intervention #3) and the 
risk of COPD without smoking (intervention #1). 
 
As with CDE, there is no causal effect of A on M (Figure 1c) and therefore we can fix either A 
or M first. Viewed from this perspective, both the CDE and NDE can be assessed with three 
interventions and measurements.  
 
Sufficient Causal Framework 
The traditional cross-world independence assumption is usually stated within the context of an 
idealized randomized experiment. The potential outcomes framework illustrates how both CDE 
and NDE can be estimated through idealized cross-over randomized trials in which the 
investigators could also intervene on the mediator.1 When cross-over trials are not possible (e.g. 
outcome is mortality), CDE is still considered estimable but NDE is not.13 However, if we use 
causal diagrams that incorporate sufficient causal sets for M,14, 15, 16 then we can estimate NDE in 
a randomized trial in some contexts.  
 
Figure 2 is a generic diagram using letters for variables to incorporate the sufficient causal sets 
described by Rothman 17 into causal diagrams.16, 17, 18 Component causes other than those for A 
on M (i.e. CCam), and A on Y (i.e. CCay) are omitted for clarity.  
 
 
Figure 2: A causal diagram showing sufficient causal sets for the effects of A on M and 
M on Y; component causes for Lm and C on M, and for Ly, C, M and A-M on Y are 
omitted for clarity as they are not relevant for our message. In A, the natural world is 
presented where A combines with component cause CCam to cause M. M is also caused 
by Lm and C and their respective component causes (omitted for clarity). A, C, M, CCay 
and Ly and the interactions shown represent the total set of causes of Y.  In B, the 
investigators have created a hypothetical world where the component cause CCam is 
removed. Therefore, there is no path from A to M, but M continues to be caused by Lm 
and C.  
 
In Figure 2a, A combines with CCam (component cause of a sufficient causal set for the effect of 
A on M) to cause M. In our example, A represents “smoking”, and CCam would represent the 
harmful chemicals within cigarettes. There are additional causes of M (i.e., Lm, C, and their 
respective component causes that are omitted for clarity). M causes Y regardless of how M itself 
occurs. In this example, A-CCam is the only sufficient cause for M that includes A as a 
component cause. If our “intervention to fix M” is to remove the component cause CCam of this 
sufficient cause, then such an intervention removes the arrow-directed path from A to M but 
allows other causes of M (e.g., L, C) to continue to act (Figure 2b). Figure 2b therefore 
represents the NDE. 
 
NDE is also said to require an additional assumption for identifiability compared to CDE; A 
cannot affect confounders of the mediator-outcome relationship (i.e. A causes C). However, 
when A causes C (Figure 1a or 2a), there are simply four paths from A to Y (A → M → Y, A → 
Y, A → C → Y, and A → C → M → Y). In this context, the “NDE” that authors usually 
describe (removing the direct arrow from A to M)19 still has an open path A → C → M. Like 
CDE, estimating NDE requires interventions that block all paths from A to M, not just one of 
them. Therefore, there would have to be an additional intervention blocking the effect of C on M 
(to block the path of A to C to M). However, this is not additional “assumption” but rather part 
of the direct effect definition; the CDE also requires blocking this path because one must block 
all causes of M. This perspective may be underappreciated because authors often say “fix M=0” 
(or M=1) without being explicit about the intervention required to eliminate the effect of C on M. 
 
Clinical Relevance of Controlled versus Natural Effects 
We believe both CDE and NDE have important strengths and limitations. CDE might be easier 
to estimate but they require fixing M = 0 for every participant. Is it meaningful to fix the amount 
of inhaled harmful chemicals for every participant to the same value, 0 or otherwise? The 
underlying assumption of CDE is that one can eliminate all causes of harmful chemical 
inhalation (M) apart from the desired intervention to reduce the harm of smoking, which seems 
daunting. Conversely, the NDE informs on our causal question related to removing harmful 
chemicals from smoking, i.e. only one cause of M.  
 
NDE may help develop targets for new interventions. Our motivating example was to remove 
harmful chemicals from smoking, which was likely considered impossible 20 years ago. 
However, we may be able to achieve this through vaping of safe chemicals (notwithstanding 
cases under investigation20). Smoking without inhaling harmful chemicals (use of vaping; A = 1) 
versus smoking with inhaling harmful chemicals (regular cigarettes A = 0) may still have 
negative effects on COPD independent of M through heat-damage or tar. Because the CDE 
estimates the effect when all harmful chemical inhalation is removed and not just those due to 
smoking, it is the NDE that addresses our question. Further, because almost every “cause” 
requires component causes to form a sufficient causal set, our perspective of NDE is likely 
relevant across most causes of most conditions. Finally, because there are almost always multiple 
causes of damage to any human organ (i.e. to M), it is not clear how the CDE has greater clinical 
relevance compared to NDE.  
 
Decomposition of total effects is a theoretical exercise with important challenges.3, 4 Still, NDE 
inform on the potential value of such new interventions even if they do not provide an accurate 
estimate of the effect. For example, whatever new intervention is developed to block the effect of 
A on M is unlikely to be an idealized intervention that has one and only one effect.13 The value 
of the new intervention will depend on the total causal effect across all paths. The recent number 
of cases with lung damage from vaping underscore the importance of such testing.  
 
As health researchers, we have to decide which hypothetically beneficial interventions should be 
tested given limited funding opportunities. We believe this requires we create a new causal 
diagram for each of the interventions. Each causal diagram would incorporate our knowledge 
about the direct and indirect paths in the presence of the intervention. One then simply chooses 
to test the intervention that theoretically leads to the greatest impact based on our synthesis of 
evidence and assumptions. 
 
Summary 
At the outset, we mentioned that our conceptual perspective is consistent with more recent work 
on mediation of natural effects 5, 6, 7, 8. Stensrud et al. recently proposed “separable effects” in 
reference to examining competing events.8 Conceptually, competing events represent mediating 
pathways between A on Y with some paths being deterministic. The concepts are very similar to 
the interventionist and sufficient causal approaches we describe here, where paths between 
variables are “split” so that different sufficient causal sets for A on M are represented by 
different paths in an extended graph. The separable effects refer to the effects of an intervention 
that blocks only one of the sufficient causal sets. A more generalized form of separable effects 
might resolve other concerns with natural effects. 
 
In summary, NDE is meaningful if one is interested in developing a co-intervention that blocks 
one cause of M, i.e. the effect of A. CDE is meaningful if one is interested in developing an 
intervention that blocks every single cause of M, generally a more elusive task.  
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